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An Initial Look at the Tokyo Grain
Exchange Non-GMO Soybean Contract
Joe L. Parcell
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) such as soybeans and corn have garnered
considerable consumer attention due to the concern over potential effects from
using these commodities as inputs into food production. In the simplest form,
segregation of bioengineered and non-bioengineered crops is an identity-preserved
system. For these identity-preserved systems to exist, there must be a market
discovery mechanism in place whereby supply and demand factors interact to
establish a market price. In May 2000, the Tokyo Grain Exchange began a non-
genetically modified organism (non-GMO) soybean contract. This article describes
information garnered from the first public-offered identity-preserved marketplace.
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Considerable attention has been given to the economics of nontransgenic [or non-
genetically modified organism (non-GMO)] commodities (see Heiman, Just, and
Zilberman, 2000; Miranowski et al., 2000; Sparling, Turvey, and Mark, 1999). Yet,
the issue of market segregation costs and returns for non-GMO commodities has
only recently garnered the attention of economists (Maltsbarger and Kalaitzan-
donakes, 2000). To further motivate the issue of market segregation during the 1999
crop year, grain-merchandising firms (such as Bungee, ADM, and AE Staley)
requested that producers segregate transgenic and nontransgenic crops. This request
was made because of a perceived differentiated demand which might cause non-
transgenic crops to receive a market premium relative to transgenic crops. Soon
thereafter, however (and formally in Spring 2000), these firms backed away from
earlier statements and cited a lack of market premium relative to segregation cost as
the primary reason—i.e., lack of demand for these differentiated products. Although
the above measures suggest that, on a large scale, the segregating costs exceed
premiums, markets have arisen for non-GMO crops. In particular, the Tokyo Grain
Exchange (TGE) began offering a non-GMO soybean contract in May 2000.
Why would such a market develop? In 1999/2000, Japan imported 4.75 million
metric tons of soybeans. Most of these soybean imports originated in the United
States. Soybeans are primarily used as inputs for Japanese food products. Thus, as




























      Sources:  Kalaitzandonakes, 1999; USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2000
           Figure 1.  Rate of adoption of transgenic and hybrid corn in the
           United States after initial use of technology
2000 
the percentage of acreage planted to transgenic crops in the United States increased
(refer to Figure 1) and consumer concerns over use of transgenic crops heightened,
consumers and processors in Japan began sourcing nontransgenic soybeans. In addi-
tion, Japan adopted a mandatory labeling policy of non-GMO and GMO food
products to begin in April 2001. A natural progression for the price discovery
process for a regulated differentiated market was the development of a futures
market contract.
The TGE non-GMO soybean futures contract is the first such public-traded com-
modity for a non-bioengineered crop. Furthermore, this contract can be considered
as the first public futures contract for an identity-preserved crop. Such a marketplace
acts as a price discovery mechanism whereby a premium for the identity-preserved
crop (e.g., non-GMO soybean) is realized.
The primary objective of this article is to provide an initial examination of the
Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO soybean contract. In the sections that follow, the
contract is introduced and then compared to a conventional soybean contract traded
at the TGE. Similarly, a description of the market premium is presented and then
compared to the cost of segregating non-GMO soybeans.
The TGE Trading System
The following information is available online at the Tokyo Grain Exchange web site.
The non-GMO and conventional soybean futures contracts traded at the TGE are
transacted through session trading with a single “provisional” price during the trading
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round. Trading is transacted via computer. Each member of the exchange is linked
to the main exchange computer, and an abbreviated name of each member appears
on the screen for everyone to see. Exchange members indicate the number of buy
and/or sell orders, and these appear on the screen next to their name. As an initial
“provisional” price is displayed, members determine whether to stay in the market
or exit the market with a counter order. The “provisional” price is fixed when the
quantity of sell orders equals the quantity of buy orders. If the initial “provisional”
price offered does not cause equilibrium to occur, then the exchange operator changes
the price until sell orders equal buy orders. For example, if the number of buy orders
exceeds the number of sell orders by 50 (appears at 50+ on the screen), then the
exchange operator will increase the price incrementally until the number of sell
orders equals the number of buy orders. This process occurs for every trading month
offered for the contract consecutively from the contract closest to expiration to the
furthest deferred contract.
Contract Specification
Table 1 highlights the difference in contract specifications between the TGE conven-
tional and non-GMO contracts. There are five primary contract specification and
exchange requirement differences. First, the contract size for the non-GMO contract
is one-third the size of the conventional contract (10,000 kg versus 30,000 kg).
Second, the position limits for the non-GMO contract are three times larger than
under the conventional contract. This effectively allows hedgers of non-GMO soy-
beans to deliver or take delivery of an amount similar to the conventional soybean
contract that is three times the contract size. Third, the contract grades are slightly
different locations of U.S. origin. Fourth, deliverable quality grades are different.
Fifth, the initial margin for the non-GMO contract is 25,000 yen compared to 70,000
yen for the conventional contract. The initial margin for the non-GMO contract is
greater than one-third the size of the conventional. This is likely due to the perceived
greater volatility in the non-GMO market. However, similar initial margin require-
ments are true of mini and full contracts traded in the United States.
Trading Volume
Figure 2 graphically depicts the conventional and non-GMO April 2001 contract
volume. The ratio of non-GMO to conventional contract volume has averaged over
3 for the April contract. As noted above, the size of the non-GMO soybean contract
is one-third the quantity of the conventional contract. Thus, the non-GMO contract
bushel volume (at three times greater contract volume) is equivalent to a conven-
tional soybean contract bushel volume. Relative to the December 2000 contract (not
shown), volume in the April non-GMO and April conventional contract has been
nearly five times larger. The December 2000 non-GMO-to-conventional contract
volume ratio has averaged around 1.88   Spring 2001 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 1.  Tokyo Grain Exchange Contract Specifications
Description Conventional Soybean Contract Non-GMO Soybean Contract
Launched March 1984 May 2000
Contract Size 30,000 kg/1,180 bushels 10,000 kg/392 bushels
Delivery Months February, April, June, August, October,
December within a 12-month period
Same as conventional
Price Quotation Yen per 1,000 kg Yen per 1,000 kg
Minimum Price
Fluctuation
10 yen per 1,000 kg (300 yen per contract) 10 yen per 1,000 kg (100 yen per contract)
Maximum Price
Fluctuation
< 1,000 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard
price is under 20,000 yen
< 1,200 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard
price is from 20,000 yen to, but not
including, 40,000 yen
< 1,400 yen per 1,000 kg, if the standard
price is from 40,000 yen and up
< No price limits in the current month 
from the 15th of the delivery month
Same as conventional
Position Limits Current delivery month 100 lots, 1st
contract month following the current
delivery month 200; 2nd contract month
500 lots and 1,500 lots from the 3rd
contract month onward
Current delivery month 300 lots, 1st
contract month following the current
delivery month 600; 2nd contract month
1,500 lots and 3,000 lots from the 3rd
contract month onward
Last Trading Day 2 business days prior to the delivery day Same as conventional
Delivery Day 1 business day prior to the last business day
of the delivery month; December 24th for
December contract–if not a business day,




 a GMO or a mixture of GMO and non-GMO
No. 2 yellow soybeans of Indiana, Ohio,
and Michigan origin produced in the
U.S.A. (non-screened, stored in silo)
Identity-preserved non-GMO No. 2
yellow soybeans of Iowa, Illinois, and
Wisconsin origin produced in the U.S.A.
(non-screened, stored in silo)
Deliverable Grade GMO or a mixture of GMO and non-GMO
No. 2 yellow soybeans of Iowa, Illinois,
and Wisconsin origin produced in the
U.S.A. (non-screened, stored in silo);
effective from the April 2001 contract
month and onward months
Identity-preserved non-GMO No. 2
yellow soybeans of Iowa, Illinois, and
Wisconsin origin produced in the U.S.A.








 c Exchange-designated warehouses in




70,000 kg 25,000 kg
a TGE also refers to “contract grade” as “standard grade” for non-GMO soybean contracts.
b TGE also refers to “method of settlement” as “delivery system” for non-GMO soybean contracts.











































































































































































 Figure 2.  TGE conventional and non-GMO soybean April
 contract trading volume (5/18/00 to 12/19/00)
Non-GMO Soybean Premium
To compute the premium, the difference between the conventional and non-GMO
contract was calculated (Tokyo Grain Exchange, 2000), converted to U.S. dollars
using the exchange rate on that date (St. Louis Federal Reserve, 2000), and then
converted to a per bushel value. Figure 3 illustrates the price difference (i.e.,
premium) between the non-GMO and conventional soybean contracts for the May
18 to December 19, 2000 period. The December 2000 and April and August 2001
contracts are represented. Early on, the premium ranged between $0.25 and $0.40
per bushel. By the end of July, premiums began to fluctuate independent of the
contract month. Some of this variability may be due to relatively low volume (thin
market) for some of the conventional and non-GMO contracts (e.g., the December
non-GMO contract has had as few as 15 contracts traded). As the December 2000
contract approached expiration, the premium exceeded $1/bushel, while the price for
the other contracts ranged from $0.20/bushel to $0.60/bushel. Unfortunately, there
are insufficient data at this time to empirically examine the cause of the premium
variability between contract months or over time.
The premium shown in figure 3 represents the value paid for a bushel of non-
GMO soybean of U.S. origin at delivery locations in Japan. Because in a competitive
market, such as the Japan non-GMO market, marginal revenue equals marginal cost,
the premium should represent the additional marketing and production costs of
 !!!!! April 2001, Non-GMO



































































































































































































































Figure 3.  Computed price difference (premium) between U.S.-
origin non-GMO and conventional soybean price quoted at the
Tokyo Grain Exchange for the December 2000 and April and
August 2001 contracts (5/18/00 to 12/19/00)
segregating non-GMO soybeans. A recent study by Lin, Chambers, and Harwood
(2000) estimated the segregation costs of non-biotech soybean between the county
elevator and export elevator to be as high as $0.54/bushel and, even under less
stringent assumptions, the segregation cost could be $0.18/bushel. Maltsbarger and
Kalaitzandonakes (2000) calculated segregation costs to range from $0.16 to $0.27
per bushel at the local elevator level. Clearly, these segregation costs are close to or
above the premium offered at the TGE, and segregation costs involved in shipping
from the export elevator to Japan have not been included. The exception is the
premium observed in the final trading weeks of the December 2000 contract. The
increase in premium may better reflect the market price long positions some holders
are willing to pay for accepting delivery from short-position holders.
The premium for non-GMO crops should cover the marginal cost of producing
and segregating non-GMO crops. Yet, anecdotal evidence from TGE non-GMO soy-
bean contracts, combined with estimated segregation and opportunity costs, suggests
otherwise. Unfortunately, information is just now becoming available on the segrega-
tion and opportunity costs at the farm level. An entire issue of AgBioForum (Spring
1999) was dedicated to discussion surrounding the opportunity costs (i.e., cost
savings) to producers of using nontransgenic seed. However, further analyses will
be required to effectively derive the segregation and opportunity costs.
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!!!!   August 2001  Parcell The Tokyo Grain Exchange Non-GMO Soybean Contract   91
Discussion
What about producer premiums for non-GMO soybeans? The producer must account
for segregation and opportunity costs of producing an identity-preserved commodity.
Based on the Tokyo Grain Exchange non-GMO soybean market premium, in com-
bination with initial analyses of segregation and opportunity costs, there appears
to be little opportunity for producers to incur significant increased revenues (after
everyone takes a piece of the pie) from producing non-GMO soybeans. This finding
suggests that producers and agribusinesses are underestimating segregation and
opportunity costs of producing non-GMO soybeans on a commodity level (i.e.,
supply exceeds demand). Similarly, it may be that existing contracts for food-grade
soybean production in the United States destined for the Japanese market are filling
this niche market. Alternatively, there may be a level of uncertainty surrounding
value of non-GMO soybeans in food production—i.e., firms are unsure of consumer
demand for non-GMO products.
Because it is impossible to differentiate hedgers from speculators, the actual
demand for non-GMO soybeans is difficult to estimate at the TGE. Some Japanese
buyers of non-GMO soybeans of U.S. origin have expressed concern over quality
of soybeans that may be delivered on this contract (Nill, 2000). The contract specifi-
cations do not list particular levels of quality characteristics (e.g., oil content), and
most of the non-GMO soybeans used in Japan are for food products.
Thus, establishing quality specifications with an identity-preserved market, such
as the TGE non-GMO soybean contract, is important. Further information is needed
to understand the segregation costs of identity-preserved grains, because as addi-
tional identity-preserved price discovery mechanisms develop, more questions are
likely to arise. As suggested by some of my peers and as evident from the discussion
above, the debate over biotechnology will enhance the need for economists to more
critically evaluate the costs and benefits of an identity-preserved food marketing
system.
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